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I.
INTRODUCTION

The class action device is critical to the enforcement of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. For decades, Title VII class actions have resulted

in extensive reforms in employers' policies and millions of dollars in

monetary relief for thousands of employees nationwide. 1 However, this
traditional tool of enforcement has come under attack. The Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which provides compensatory and punitive damages, and attendant
jury trials in cases alleging intentional discrimination, was designed to
enhance enforcement and expand remedies. 2 Its enactment, however, has
created a schism among the courts over the propriety of class certification

where employees seek monetary damages as well as injunctive relief for
Title VII claims.
The courts of appeals hotly contest what the proper standard is for
determining whether monetary damages or injunctive relief predominates, a
necessary inquiry for determining whether plaintiffs are entitled to class
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

1. See Press Release, Texaco, Texaco Announces Settlement in Class Action Lawsuit (Nov. 15,
1996) (African-American class received $176 million in settlement with Texaco), available at
http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/diversity/; Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 687-88 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (describing "far reaching" programmatic relief of settlement in Title VII class action against
Coca-Cola); Julie Dunn & Andy Vuong, Retail Titans Battle Bias More Workers Sue Warehouse Stores
Rapid Growth is Blamed Wal-Mart, Home Depot and Costco Have Dealt with Claims that They
Discriminated Against Workers Based on Race and Sex, DENVER POST, Sept. 19, 2004, at KI
(describing Home Depot $5.5 million settlement in employment discrimination class action and others);
Mark Diana, Beginning of the End of Money Damage Class Actions? The Future of Big Money
Employment DiscriminationClass Actions, On the Rise Since the 1991 Civil Rights Act was Passed,Is
Unsettled, N.J.L.J., Mar. 25, 2002 at S2 (discussing "extraordinary settlements" against Coca-Cola
($192.5 million), Home Depot ($87 million), Publix ($82 million), and Texaco ($176 million)); Nadya
Aswad & Joyce Cutler, Home Depot Agrees to Pay $65 Million to Settle Sex Discrimination Class
Action, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 183, at A- I1 (Sept. 22, 1997)); Lesley Frieder Wolf, Evading
Friendly Fire: Achieving Class CertificationAfter the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1847, 1847 n. 3 (2000) (citing multi-million dollar settlements against employers such as Home Depot,
Boeing, Amtrak and others).
2. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2-3, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (1991).
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3
The Fifth Circuit concluded in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., that

monetary relief predominates unless it is "incidental," and that
4 This
compensatory and punitive damages are by "nature" not "incidental.
5
narrow interpretation of Rule 23 has been adopted by the Third, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits.6 On the opposite end of the spectrum is the Second
Circuit's standard set forth in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad
Co., which permits the courts to use a liberal "ad hoc" approach when
determining predomination. 7 This approach is also embraced by the Ninth
Circuit.8
This division between the circuits is reason for great concern.
Employees are currently subject to inconsistent and inadequate standards of
justice. The more restrictive formulation set forth in Allison threatens to
undermine the enforcement of civil rights in three ways. First, the Fifth
Circuit's adoption of an "incidental" standard of damages and its
conclusion that compensatory and punitive damages are not per se
"incidental" make it much harder for plaintiffs seeking such damages to get
a case certified as a class action under provision (b)(2), or even (b)(3) in
some circuits, of the federal class action rule. Deprivation of this
enforcement mechanism will result in unchecked systemic employment
discrimination because of the critical role the class action plays in Title VII
enforcement. Second, the propensity of the Fifth Circuit (and other circuits)
to deny certification to plaintiffs seeking class-wide monetary relief under
(b)(2) forces plaintiffs to forgo relief to which they are entitled as a cost of
class certification. Consequently, deterrence objectives are undermined and
Finally, the heightened standard for
defendants receive a windfall.
certification under (b)(2) compels employees to seek certification under
(b)(3), a provision which imposes greater costs, burdens, and scrutiny.
These additional hurdles may be just enough to prevent some plaintiffs
from vindicating their civil rights.
3. 151 F.3d 402, 415-18 (5th Cir. 1998).
4. Id.at417.
5. An alternative approach is suggested by the Seventh Circuit. While the Seventh Circuit has
adopted Allison's "incidental" predomination test for (b)(2) classes, this circuit has put forward various
ways a district court may be able to certify such cases under (b)(3). See Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc.,
195 F.3d 894, 898-99 (7th Cir. 1999); Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 139, 216 F.3d
577, 581-82 (7th Cir. 2000).

6. See Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 02-8057, 2003 WL 355417, at * I (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2003);
Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); accord,e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co.,
400 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 2005); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (1 1th Cir. 2001).

Cf

Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 446-47 (6th Cir. 2002) (in race discrimination
case brought under Equal Credit Opportunity Act, court reserved judgment as to whether compensatory
damages are ever recoverable in a 23(b)(2) class action, but concluded that if they were, such damages
dominated over the injunctive relief sought because of the "highly individualized determinations that
would be required to determine those damages").
7.
8.

Robinson, 267 F.3d 147, 162-64 (2d Cir. 2001).
Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Given the importance of the class action mechanism to civil rights
enforcement, it is imperative that the predomination approach-taken by
the majority of circuits that have ruled on this issue-be abandoned in favor
of the more equitable ad hoc balancing approach established by the Second
Circuit in Robinson. Under the latter approach, plaintiffs will be able to
effectively vindicate their statutory rights under Title VII, courts will retain
their discretionary power under Rule 23, and Congressional intent
articulated in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will be honored. The latest
amendments to Rule 23 and the recently enacted Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005 only bolster the protections against judiciary abuse of power in
class certification determinations, thereby preserving due process. Thus,
the minority's ad hoc balancing approach to predomination is preferable to
the majority's bright-line one.
II.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIRCUIT CONFLICT OVER THE
INTERPRETATION OF RULE 23's PREDOMINATION REQUIREMENT AFTER
THE ENACTMENT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

A.

1991

The CentralRole of Rule 23(b)(2) Certification
in Civil Rights Enforcement

The class action mechanism has been the cornerstone of civil rights
enforcement, particularly in Title VII actions, for the past forty years. Rule
23 governs cases brought in federal court on behalf of a class of people. In
order to represent a class, plaintiffs must meet all four criteria of Rule 23(a):
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, 9 and
one of three criteria set forth in Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b)(1) is designed
primarily to protect the interests of defendants who may be forced to follow
inconsistent or incompatible judgments and absent class members whose
rights may be compromised in the absence of a class action.' 0 The most
common provision utilized for Title VII class actions has been provision
(b)(2), which applies where "the party opposing the class has acted or

9. These prerequisites are set forth in Rule 23(a): "One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
10. Rule 23(b)(1) certification is appropriate where the prosecution of separate actions would
create a risk of either "(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interests[.]" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
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refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole[.]l"" Conduct that is "generally applicable"
means that "the party opposing the class 'has acted in a consistent manner
towards members of the class so that his actions may be viewed as part of a
'
pattern of activity, or to establish a regulatory scheme, to all members. "'12
Rule 23(b)(3) certification is meant to provide a representative action where
the class is less cohesive than those certified under (b)(1) or (b)(2), but
3 Specifically,
efficiency and manageability make certification desirable.
certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) where "the court finds that
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy."' 4 Because a (b)(3) class is by nature less
cohesive and often involves monetary damages, class members are entitled
5
to notice and the right to opt out of the class."
Because civil rights cases have historically sought to curtail
discrimination on a broad scale, they are uniquely suited for (b)(2)
certification. 6 Plaintiffs in these cases have customarily sought injunctive
and declaratory relief for systemic conduct based on race and other
protected statuses. This benefits the class as a whole. Such cohesiveness
7
makes notice and the right to opt out unnecessary, especially where

II.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

12.

CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1775 at 43-46 (3d ed.

2005).
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee notes to 1966 amendment (Rule 23(b)(3) is
intended to provide aggregate litigation where "class-action treatment is not as clearly called for as in
those described above, but it may nevertheless be convenient and desirable depending upon the

particular facts. Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results" (citing
CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 201 (1950))).

14. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)("For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must
direct to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice must ...

state ...

that a

class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires, that the court will
exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, . . . and the binding effect of a class
judgment on class members under Rule 23(c)(3).").
16. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining that a Title VII
class action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for systemic discrimination is "obviously the
paradigm of a Rule 23(b)(2) class action"); East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S.
395, 405 (1977) (stating that race discrimination cases "are often by their very nature class suits,
involving class-wide wrongs").
17. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1975).
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plaintiffs only seek class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief.'8 It is well
recognized that provision (b)(2) in particular "was promulgated . . .
essentially as a tool for facilitating civil rights actions."' 9 The Supreme
Court has more recently recognized the centrality of Rule 23(b)(2) to civil
20
rights class actions as well.
B.

The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991

Despite the pivotal role (b)(2) certification has played in the
enforcement of civil rights in general, and Title VII rights in particular, the
propriety of such certification is being questioned in the wake of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Prior to 1991, employees had limited recourse for Title
VII actions; they could pursue only equitable relief, such as injunctions,
declarations, reinstatement, back pay, and front pay. The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 enhanced employees' remedies, enabling them to seek
compensatory and punitive damages and a jury trial in Title VII cases
alleging intentional discrimination.2'
The Act, however, did not immediately awaken the giant; rather,
employees continued to successfully bring class actions seeking certain
monetary and injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2)."2 The courts agreed
that in order for a case to be certified under (b)(2), monetary relief could not
18. See Jones v. CCH-LIS Legal Info. Servs., No 97-CIV-4372, 1998 WL 671446, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1998); see, e.g., Jefferson v. Windy City Maint., Inc., No. 96-C-7686, 1998 WL
474115, at *10 (N.D. 11. Aug. 4, 1998); Vaszlavik v. Storage Tech. Corp., 183 F.R.D. 264, 272 (D.
Colo. 1998) (ERISA case).
19. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.43[l][b], at 23-192 (3d ed.
2005); see advisory committee's note to Proposed Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966)
(explaining that Rule 23(b)(2) certification was intended to apply to civil rights cases where "final relief
of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with
respect to the class as a whole, is appropriate"); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
("Title VII and other civil rights class actions are frequently certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2).");
Holmes v. Cont'l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1152 (11 th Cir. 1983) (noting that civil rights class actions
are usually certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2)); Kincade v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 506
n.6 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Barefield v. Chevron, No. C-86-2427-TEH, 1988 WL 188433 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 6, 1988) (explaining it is "often acknowledged, (b)(2) was deliberately drafted to facilitate the
vindication of civil rights through the class action device"); see also Harvey S. Bartlett III, Determining
Whether a Title VII PlaintiffClass 's "'Aim is True ": The Legacy of Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.for
Employment DiscriminationClass Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2), 74 TuL. L. REv. 2163, 2170-71
(2000) (concluding that some courts treat employment discrimination cases as "categorically certifiable"
under Rule 23(b)(2), as opposed to analyzing them on a case-by-case basis).
20. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) ("Civil rights cases against
parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples" of (b)(2) classes).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1981(c) (2001).
22. See, e.g., Orlowski v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., No. 95 C1666, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1984 (N.D. I11.Feb. 21, 1997), affd, 172 F.R.D. 370 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (certifying a (b)(2) case where
monetary relief was sought because it did not predominate and court counseled that disputes over which
type of relief predominates should be avoided); Jones v. CCH-LIS Legal Info. Servs., No 97-CIV-4372,
1998 WL 671446, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1998) (focusing on appropriateness of certifying (b)(2) class
in civil rights case and not focusing on whether monetary damages predominated over injunctive relief).
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"predominate" over the equitable relief sought-a standard articulated by
the Advisory Committee Notes that accompany Rule 23. However, the
inclusion of compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials to Title VII
ultimately led to a major division among the courts.2 3 The Fifth Circuit's
ruling in Allison marked the moment at which the giant awoke and the
propriety of (b)(2) certification for employees seeking monetary damages
and injunctive relief came into sharp focus.
C. Allison v. Citgo
The Fifth Circuit, in Allison, was the first appellate court to hold that
plaintiffs who pursued compensatory and punitive damages in addition to
injunctive relief were precluded from seeking class-wide relief under Rule
23(b)(2). The Fifth Circuit held that:
[M]onetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class actions unless it is incidental
to requested injunctive or declaratory relief. By incidental, we mean
damages that flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the
claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief.24
More specifically, the court defined "incidental" damages as 1)
"concomitant with, not merely consequential to, class-wide injunctive or
declaratory relief'; 2) "capable of computation by means of objective
standards and not dependent in any significant way on the intangible,
subjective differences of each class member's circumstances"; and 3) "not
requiring additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each
individual's case;" and not introducing "new and substantial legal or factual
issues", or entailing "complex individualized determinations." 25 The Fifth
Circuit's definition of incidental damages has also been adopted by the
Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.26
Using this approach, the Fifth Circuit in Allison affirmed the district
court's conclusion that neither the compensatory nor punitive damages were
sufficiently incidental to the injunctive and declaratory relief to warrant
(b)(2) certification.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the amount of
compensatory damages could not be determined by objective standards, but
rather required specific, individualized proof of actual injury for each class

23. See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 236 n. 368 (2003) (explaining "Judicial efforts to give practical meaning to

this passage have led to a dizzying array of approaches.").
24. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998).
25.

Id.

26.

See Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 02-8057, 2003 WL 355417, at * 2 (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2003);

In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 2005); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11 th
Cir. 2001).
27.

Allison, 151 F.3d at 416.
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member.28 The Fifth Circuit concluded that because the punitive damages

were dependent upon the determination of the compensatory damages, the
former also required individualized proof and were based on subjective
differences. 29
Allison has been interpreted by some as the death knell for Title VII
(b)(2) class actions seeking compensatory and punitive damages in addition
to equitable relief.3" Absent Supreme Court intervention on the issue, this
interpretation is not unreasonable in certain circuits. Allison's definition of
incidental damages is interpreted in such a way that compensatory and
punitive damages automatically fail to qualify, thereby making it practically

impossible to seek such remedies in a (b)(2) class.3 The adoption of such a
"rigid bright-line" test strips district courts of their discretion to certify a
class action when appropriate and to conduct a "rigorous analysis" as

required.3 Courts are left with little room to navigate (b)(2) certification in
Title VII cases.33

28. Id. at 416-17.
29. Id.at 416-18.
30. See, e.g., id. at 431 (Dennis, J., dissenting) ("The majority's rule, contrary to the intent of the
drafters and Congress, threatens a drastic curtailment of the use of (b)(2) class actions in the
enforcement of Title VII and other civil rights acts."); see also Bartlett III, supra note 19, at 2165, 2184
("That Allison represents the demise of the effectiveness of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 remains
inescapable..."); Wolf, supra note 1,at 1848 (the combination of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
current case law, e.g., Allison, "threatens to drastically curtail-if not eliminate altogether-employment
discrimination class actions); see generally Nikaa Baugh Jordan, Allison v. Citgo Petroleum: The Death
Knellfor the Title VII Class Action?, 51 ALA. L. REV. 847 (2000).
3 1. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 426 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
32. See id.
(Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,
161 (1982) (district courts must conduct a "rigorous analysis" in determining the appropriateness of
class certification); U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 408 (1980) (explaining that district
courts are not obligated to construct subclasses).
33. The plot has thickened even further. In the case of In the Matter of Monumental Life
Insurance Co., IndustrialLife Ins. Litigation, the Fifth Circuit addressed the scope of Allison in a nonemployment case. Plaintiffs brought suit against three insurance companies for discriminating against
African-Americans in setting premiums for low-value life insurance policies. The district court found
that plaintiffs' damages predominated over the injunctive relief sought and therefore denied certification
under Rule 23(b)(2). In re Indus. Life Ins. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 571, 572-74 (E.D. La. 2002), rev'd sub
nom. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004). However, the Fifth Circuit
reversed, concluding that because the damages could be calculated mechanically based on "factors
developed and maintained in the course of defendants' business," such damages did not predominate. In
re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 418-20, n. 20 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, American Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. Bratcher, 125 S.Ct. 277 (2004). In Monumental Life Insurance, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that a refund-type case, involving "factors such as premium rate, issue age, and benefits paid" presented
an ideal situation for calculating damages using objective standards. 365 F.3d at 420 n. 20. While the
majority conceded, "[o]ne is left wondering in what circumstances (if any) the dissent would permit
monetary damages in a rule 23(b)(2) class," 365 F.3d at 420 n. 20, thereby belying the fact that the Fifth
Circuit itself has yet to define the precise scope of Allison, the case confirms its narrow approach in
employment cases. The Monumental Life Insurance majority made clear that its facts were
distinguishable from those in Allison: "This is not . .. like Allison, a title VII case in which class
members' claims for compensatory and punitive damages necessarily implicated[ ] subjective

2005

ALLISON v. CITGO'S THREAT TO TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS

413

Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's cramped interpretation of what
constitutes predomination is unwarranted. Based on the text of Rule 23, the
accompanying Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23(b)(2), and the
underlying policies of both Rule 23(b)(2) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,34
the Fifth Circuit was not compelled to read predomination so narrowly.
Rule 23 is silent on the issue of whether monetary relief is permitted in a
(b)(2) class; nothing in the Rule's text suggests that certification under such
The Advisory Committee Notes
circumstances is impermissible.35
interpreting provision (b)(2) shed some light on the issue, noting that (b)(2)
"does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates
exclusively or predominately to money damages. '36 This, of course, means
that the Advisory Committee anticipated that some amount of monetary
damages would be permissible in a (b)(2) class, so long as they did not
predominate. 37 Given the Committee's endorsement of civil rights cases as
prototypical (b)(2) class actions,38 it follows that the Committee must have
foreseen the possibility of civil rights (b)(2) class actions involving
monetary damages. The underlying policy rationale for Rule 23(b)(2) is to
provide an effective tool for the vindication of civil rights, 39 which
countenances certification where employees seek compensatory and
punitive damages, as well as equitable relief. Finally, the purpose of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 favors a liberal interpretation of (b)(2) certification
because it was enacted to bolster, not limit, employees' ability to seek relief
for intentional employment discrimination.4" This is true in the class
context as well. For all the above stated reasons, the Fifth Circuit and
others need not, and should not, read Rule 23(b)(2) so restrictively.4'
365 F.3d at 419. The impact of Monumental Life
differences of each plaintiff's circumstances.'
Insurance on district court rulings in employment cases will be important to follow.
34. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1998) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting), reh 'g en banc denied with clarification,No. 96-30489, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24651 (5th
Cir. Oct. 2, 1998).
35. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see also Parker v. Local Union No. 1466, 642 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir.
1981) (explaining that while Rule 23(b)(2) explicitly refers to injunctive and declaratory relief, the text
does not exclude the possibility of monetary relief).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
37. Plaintiffs have also been successful in obtaining back pay awards in (b)(2) classes prior to the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 because of the equitable nature of such relief. See Allison,
151 F.3d at 415 ("Back pay, of course, had long been recognized as an equitable remedy under Title
VIL.") (describing cases); see, e.g., Williams v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 928-29 (9th Cir. 1982)
(describing back pay as equitable and incidental and distinguishing between compensatory damages),
amended by, No. 79-4110, 1982 WL 308873 (9th Cir. June 11, 1982).
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to subdivision (b)(2). (citing civil rights
cases as illustrative).
39. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., supra note 19, § 23.43[1][b], at 23-192 (3d ed. 2005).
40. See Pollard v. E.I. do Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001).
41. Melissa Hart offers some compelling reasons for why the courts have sought to restrict (b)(2)
certification of civil rights cases. She concludes that the courts are swayed by three things: 1) the
perception that class actions are unfair; 2) the perception that employment class actions are unnecessary;
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D. Robinson v. Metro-North
In contrast, the Second Circuit, in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R. Co., explicitly rejected Allison's test and set forth an alternative
analytical framework for certification under Rule 23(b)(2) when monetary
damages are sought.42 Robinson adopted an "ad hoc" approach, whereby
the district court must assess whether (b)(2) certification is appropriate in
light of the "relative importance of the remedies sought, given all of the
facts and circumstances of the case."43 The court may certify a (b)(2) class,
where in its "informed sound judicial discretion," it finds that:
[T]he positive weight or value [to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive or
declaratory relief sought is predominant even though compensatory or
punitive damages are . . .claimed . . .and 2) class treatment would be
efficient and manageable, thereby achieving an appreciable measure of
judicial economy. 44
The Second Circuit elaborated that even using an ad hoc approach, a
court must ensure two criteria are met to satisfy (b)(2) certification where
plaintiffs seek monetary damages and injunctive relief:
[E]ven in the absence of a possible monetary recovery, reasonable plaintiffs
would bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief sought;
and 2) the injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both reasonably
45
necessary and appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed on the merits.
The Robinson approach is designed to promote judicial efficiency and
to provide a case-by-case assessment of certification.46 While the Robinson
court conceded that (b)(2) certification of classes involving nonincidental
monetary damages could present due process risks for absent class
members, it encouraged courts to consider providing notice and opt-out
rights to alleviate this concern.47 The Ninth Circuit is the only other circuit
to adopt Robinson's analytical framework.45

and 3) the concern that employment class actions are meritless. See Melissa Hart, Will Employment
Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813 (2004).
42. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he question
we must decide is whether this bright-line bar to (b)(2) class treatment of all claims for compensatory
damages and other non-incidental damages (e.g., punitive damages) is appropriate.... [W]e believe that
it is not and therefore decline to adopt the incidental damages approach set out by the Fifth Circuit in
Allison and flowed by the district court below.").
43. Id. at 164 (quoting Hoffman v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 530, 536 (S.D. Ohio
1999)).
44. Id.
45.

Id.

46.
47.
48.

Id. at 165.
Id. at 165-67.
See Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2003).
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HybridApproaches to Class Certification

Some courts, while adopting the Allison predomination test, have
encouraged alternative means, such as bifurcation and hybrid certification, 49
for aiding employees seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief in
obtaining class certification. For example, the Seventh Circuit, in Jefferson
v. Ingersoll International Inc., suggests ways that due process concerns
might be overcome where plaintiffs seek significant monetary damages.5
Because some class members might have a significant financial stake in the
litigation, they may prefer not to be bound by a class judgment and instead
to forge litigation on their own. Under such circumstances, certification
under (b)(2) with no notice or right to opt out threatens to deprive absent
class members of due process. Rather than deny certification altogether,
Jefferson suggests that the district court consider: certifying the entire case
under Rule 23(b)(3); certifying the entire case under Rule 23(b)(2) and
provide notice and opt-out rights; or certifying class-wide liability and
equitable issues under Rule 23(b)(2) while certifying damages issues under
Rule 23(b)(3). 1 These alternatives are well within a court's discretion,
address manageability concerns, and give employees the benefit of the class
action device as a civil rights enforcement tool. They have been employed
2
by many courts.1

49. It is not unusual to bifurcate a civil rights case by having a jury consider the pattern and
practice liability at Stage I and individual damages at Stage 1I. These are referred to as Teamsters
hearings. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360-61 (1977); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 32.42 (2004).
50. Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898-99 (7th Cir. 1999). In Ingersoll, the district
court granted (b)(2) certification where plaintiffs sought money damages. The Seventh Circuit vacated
the certification order and remanded so that the district court could consider if the damages sought were
"incidental." The Seventh Circuit, however, offered alternatives for how a such a case could still be
certified as a class action, even if the monetary damages predominated. See id. at 897-98.
51. Id. at 897-99; see also Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 139, 216 F.3d 577,
581-82 (7th Cir. 2000); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 92-96 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
52. See, e.g., Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383, 387-89 (N.D. I1. 1999) (certifying a
Title VII case under (b)(2) and (b)(3)); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 233 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that hybrid certification is available in Ninth Circuit), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001);
Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1217 (1983); Beck v. Boeing Co., 203 F.R.D. 459, 465-68 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (certifying the liability
phase under (b)(2) and the damages phase under (b)(3)), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 60 F. App'x
38 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding court abused its discretion by certifying damages phase under (b)(3)
prematurely, while recognizing possibility of hybrid certification); Barefield v. Chevron, No. C-862427-TEH, 1988 WL 188433 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1988); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 205 F.R.D. 43, 48-50 (D.D.C. 2002); Wilson
v. United Int'l Investigative Servs. 401(k) Savings Plan, No. Civ.A. 01-CV-6126, 2002 WL 734339, at
* 6-7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2002) (certifying injunctive relief under (b)(2) and damages under (b)(3) to
avoid due process concerns in ERISA class action).
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The Supreme Court's Due Process Concerns

The circuit split continues because the Supreme Court has yet to
determine the due process prerequisites for putative class members seeking
significant monetary damages as well as injunctive relief under a (b)(2)
class.53 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court did,
however, address the issue of whether a court could bind absent class
members who asserted claims "wholly or predominantly for money
damages" absent contacts with the forum state.54
There, the Court
concluded that before an absent class member's cause of action was
extinguishable, due process mandated that the class member "receive notice
plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation" and "at a
minimum" be given "an opportunity to remove himself from the class."55
And, of course, an absent class member's interests had to be adequately
represented.56 Because the Court explicitly limited its ruling to the scenario
where plaintiffs sought wholly or predominantly monetary damages, there
remained the question of what due process was required when plaintiffs
sought some monetary damages as well as equitable relief in a mandatory
class action-i.e. the "Shutts problem."57
Unfortunately, this problem has not yet been solved. In Ticor Title
Insurance Co. v. Brown,58 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in hope of
resolving, inter alia, whether notice and opt-out rights were required by due
process in mandatory class actions.59 Although the Court ultimately
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted, it did note that there is "at least
a substantial possibility" that "in actions seeking monetary damages, classes
can be certified only under Rule 23(b)(3), which permits opt-out, and not
under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), which do not."6 In Adams v. Robertson,
the Court admitted its "continuing interest" in the Shutts problem but again
concluded that the petition for writ of certiorari was improvidently
granted.6 In Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp., when presented with the issue of
whether opt-out rights were necessary in mandatory class actions, the
Supreme Court declined to address the issue and instead decided the case

53. See also Nagareda, supra note 23 (discussing the problem of punitive damages within a
limited fund case under Rule 23(b)(1) and arguing that this violates Ortiz and works against the interest
of class members).
54. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
members
60.
61.

Id. at 812.
Id. (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940)).

See Linda S.Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 727, 730 (1998).
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 510 U.S. 810 (1993).
Mandatory class actions are those brought pursuant to (b)(1) or (b)(2) where putative class
do not have a right to opt-out.
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994).
Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 92 n. 6(1997).
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on other grounds.62 The Supreme Court noted, however, that the "inherent
tension between representative suits and the day-in-court ideal is only
magnified if applied to damage claims gathered in a mandatory class"
because the "legal rights of absent class members . . . are resolved
regardless of either their consent, or . . . their express wish to the
contrary."63 The Supreme Court's dicta suggest that courts' efforts to
bolster due process procedural protections for class members seeking
monetary damages in mandatory class actions are prudent. Nothing
indicates, however, that the Supreme Court would never find it appropriate
to permit (b)(2) certification where plaintiffs seek some degree of monetary
damages and injunctive relief.
In sum, the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has resulted in a
serious schism among the courts over the correct interpretation of when
monetary damages predominate, thereby foreclosing Rule 23(b)(2)
certification in employment discrimination cases. In the absence of firm
guidance from the Supreme Court on this issue, the courts will continue to
provide inconsistent and incomplete justice for employees seeking to fully
protect their Title VII statutory rights through the pursuit of compensatory
and punitive damages and jury trials.
III.
THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE PREDOMINATION
REQUIREMENT THREATENS TO UNDERMINE CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT

The narrow interpretation of the predomination requirement threatens
to undermine enforcement of Title VII in various ways. Specifically,
enforcement will be jeopardized by fewer class certifications, fewer
monetary damages being awarded, and greater costs and burdens to
plaintiffs challenging systemic intentional discrimination.
A.

Fewer Employment DiscriminationClass Actions Will Be Certified

Unlike ever before, plaintiffs challenging systemic employment
discrimination by filing class actions are facing additional, and sometimes
insurmountable, hurdles. The terrain has become littered with cases
rejected as class actions because plaintiffs sought monetary damages as well
as injunctive relief on a class-wide basis. Although employees may pursue
individual Title VII claims or have their interests represented by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission,6 4 these alternatives to a class action
62.

Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).

63.

Id. at 846-47.

64. See Daniel F. Piar, The UncertainFuture of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 305, 345 (2001) (claiming individual suit is, for the individual, "an
equivalent opportunity for justice" to the class action).
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offer no solace because of the superiority of the class action device in
vindicating civil rights.65

The class action device is an essential and irreplaceable component of
the Title VII enforcement scheme for several reasons. First, while an
employee may bring her own individual action, an employer can more
easily mask and justify discrimination when challenged on an individual
level. By bringing a pattern or practice claim against an employer, an
employee can more easily identify and expose discriminatory conduct.66

Second, as private attorneys general, plaintiffs in a class action can craft
remedies and injunctive relief that are far greater in scope than those in an
individual case. 67 Third, the class action mechanism enables individuals
with small resources and claims to pool them together and share risk and
burdens so that they can pursue such claims. In the absence of such a
scheme, it is unlikely that a "negative value suit"-an action in which the
attorney's fees exceed the available damages-would be pursued by an
individual, and, even more unlikely, by an attorney. Finally, a finding of
class-wide liability shifts the burden of proof in favor of plaintiffs. 68 By

proving a pattern or practice of discrimination, each class member enjoys a
rebuttable presumption that he was victimized by the discrimination as an
individual. 69 The defendant has the burden of proving otherwise.7" Given
the power of this procedural device, victims of employment discrimination

65. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is tasked with Title VII enforcement
in pattern or practice cases, offers no solace either. This government agency may easily be restricted by
limited resources and political will. See Hart, supra note 41, at 844; but see, Piar, supra note 64, at 34546.
66. See, e.g., Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 38 (4th Cir. 1971). The
Fourth Circuit observed: "[S]ophisticated general policies and practices of discrimination are not
susceptible to such precise delineation by a layman who is in no position to carry out a full-fledged
investigation himself' although "[l]ong observation of plant practice may bring the realization that he
and his black coemployees are not getting anywhere." Id.
67. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-29 (9th Cir. 1983) (in absence of class certification,
injunction was limited to individual plaintiffs); Nat'l Center for Immigrant Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d
1365, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1984) (same), vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009 (1987); Bresgal v.
Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that in absence of certification, class-wide relief
was only available to named plaintiffs); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 766-67 (4th
Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999) (systemic injunction going
beyond providing individual plaintiffs relief reversed); but see Piar, supra note 64, at 345-46 (arguing
that "[s]weeping changes are therefore possible (though usually only prospectively) in nonclass cases").
68. Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977)
69. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 875-76 (1984) (citing Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976)).
70. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361-62; Franks v. Bowman Transp., 424 U.S. 747, 772-73 (1976);
Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. at 875-76; Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 168 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 951 (2002). This burden-shifting
scheme is not available through other multi-aggregate party tools such as consolidation under Rule 42.
But see Piar, supra note 64, at 346 (equating efficiencies of class action with Rule 42's provision for
consolidation and severance).
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have been able to obtain significant relief for over four decades. The fewer
class actions certified, the less effective civil rights enforcement will be.
B.

Fewer Monetary Damages Will Be Awarded
to Those Who Deserve Them

The restrictive predomination requirement jeopardizes employees'
ability to obtain full relief. While the Fifth Circuit and others contend that
the inclusion of compensatory and punitive damages normally forecloses
(b)(2) and (b)(3) class certification in Title VII cases, this interpretation is
unwarranted. Such an interpretation puts plaintiffs in a dilemma that
Congress could not have intended. Employees are confronted with the
untenable choice of foregoing the monetary damages to which they are
entitled under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to ensure class-wide injunctive
relief, or abandoning class treatment altogether; thereby abandoning their
mandate to challenge widespread systemic discrimination as private
attomeys-general. It was not Congress's intention to compel victims of
intentional discrimination to choose between their right to monetary
damages and complete injunctive relief.
In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress sought to bolster
the rights of victims of intentional discrimination and expand the remedies
7
available to them, in both the individual and class action context. " This
was accomplished by providing for compensatory and punitive damages
and a jury demand.7" One of the legislature's major goals of amending the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to overturn Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.
Atonio," and Martin v. Wilks,74 decisions in which the Supreme Court

limited remedies for discrimination." The legislative history makes clear
that Congress valued the class action and anticipated its continued viability
after the 1991 amendments. Notwithstanding the minority view that
permitting damages in class actions alleging intentional discrimination on
the basis of statistical proof would unfairly burden employers and coerce

71. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No 102-166, § 2(1), 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (1994)) (finding "additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter
unlawful ... intentional discrimination in the workplace"); id. § 3(1), (4) (stating that Congress passed
the Act "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination ... in the workplace . . . and
expand[ ] the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of
discrimination"); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (I), at 4, as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 602,
603, 607 (recognizing a damages remedy is necessary for deterrence).
72. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 852 (2001) (explaining the
intention of the Act is to expand remedies, not contract them).
73. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
74. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
75. H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (1), at 4 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 595.
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them into covertly applying quotas to avoid litigation,76 Congress did not
take steps to curtail the availability of class-wide damages.77
Despite the legislature's intent to the contrary, the Fifth Circuit and
others have put plaintiffs in a no-win situation, in which some feel
compelled as a cost of certification to forgo damages altogether, to choose

between compensatory or punitive damages, or to limit the amount of
potential damages by using formulas.
For example, plaintiffs may seek punitive damages because they
arguably do not require the individualized determinations that
compensatory damages do. To the extent that the Fifth Circuit in Allison
permits a punitive damage award on a class-wide basis where each plaintiff
is affected by a discriminatory policy in the same way,78 class counsel may
chose to strategically forgo compensatory damages. In Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.,7

for example, plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart engaged in

company-wide discrimination in pay and promotions against a class of
approximately 1.5 million women, in violation of Title VII. In the largest
private-employer civil rights case in American history, the district court
certified a class action where plaintiffs chose to forgo compensatory
damages and instead sought class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief,
lost pay, and punitive damages.8" Wal-Mart has challenged the propriety of
class certification, and the Ninth Circuit has granted its Rule 23(f) petition

for review.
In Beck v. Boeing Co., female employees challenged the Boeing
Company with gender-based employment discrimination in promotions and

76. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (It), at 68 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 694, 754
(finding that "[n]ot only would H.R. I allow the recovery of punitive and compensatory damages in
individual disparate treatment cases, it would allow recovery of such damages and jury trials for class
action disparate treatment suits"); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (I), at 127 (1991), as reprintedin 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 656 ("Further, the concerns with "quotas"... are heightened by inclusion of punitive
and compensatory damages. Class action intentional discrimination claims are also based on statistical
imbalances; employers will again feel inordinate pressure to engage in race-and sex-based preferential
treatment.").
77.

See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 143, as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 672 ("Class

actions claiming intentional discrimination will be based-as they are under current law--on racial and
sexual statistical imbalances in the workforce."); H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (11), at 68, as reprintedin 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 754 ("Not only would H.R. I allow the recovery of punitive and compensatory
damages in individual disparate treatment cases, it would allow recovery of such damages and jury trials
for class action disparate treatment suits."); 137 CONG. REC. E2086-01 (1991) (statement of Rep.
Doolittle (quoting letter from Zachary Fasman, Attorney of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, to Bill
Goodling, Congressman)) ("The proponents of this legislation consistently have argued that the
expanded remedies in question will apply only to cases of intentional discrimination. In fact, the bill
would allow compensatory and punitive damages in class actions premised upon the disparate treatment
theory of discrimination.").
78. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,417 (5th Cir. 1998).
79. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
80. Id. at 141,170.
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8
compensation under Title VII and various other federal civil rights laws.
Plaintiffs chose not to seek back pay, individualized equitable relief, or
punitive damages for their promotions claims, but instead pursued
injunctive relief for a pattern or practice of discriminatory promotionmaking.82 Plaintiffs, however, did seek back pay, injunctive relief, and
punitive damages for a pattern or practice of discriminatory compensation,
83 Defendants
which would flow from a finding of class-wide liability.
argued that plaintiffs were inadequate representatives because they failed to
seek all potential relief in a mandatory class action-thereby jeopardizing
absent class members' ability to pursue such relief in the future because of
res judicata.8 4 The district court rejected defendants' argument on the
grounds that the court could certify a notice and opt-out class under (b)(3)
for the punitive damages portion of the litigation.85 Moreover, the court
recognized that in bringing only certain types of relief in a (b)(2) class,
86
plaintiffs were identifying the injunctive relief as primary. Plaintiffs used
statistics and testimony from Boeing's most senior executives to
demonstrate that Boeing's decision making impacted the class as a whole.
This convinced the court that individualized, fact-specific inquiries were
unnecessary and that punitive damages could be awarded on a class-wide
basis.8 7 Thus, the district court certified the class for the liability phase
88 Plaintiffs'
under (b)(2) and the punitive damages phase under (b)(3).
success, however, was short-lived. The Ninth Circuit vacated the court's
certification in part, concluding that it abused its discretion by certifying the
class for punitive damages claims in Phase II of the litigation. The Ninth
Circuit held that it was premature for the court to have certified the Phase II
punitive damages class.8 9
Unitary punitive damage awards are appropriate because "the purpose
of punitive damages is not to compensate the victim, but to punish and deter
the defendant, [therefore] any claim for such damages hinges, not on facts
unique to each class member, but on the defendant's conduct toward the
class as a whole." 9 Moreover, punitive damages are more likely to be

81.
part,60
82.
83.

84.

Beck v. Boeing Co., 203 F.R.D. 459, 460-61 (W.D. Wash. 2001), aff'd in part & vacated in
F. App'x 38 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished).
Id.at 461,465.
Id.

Id.
at 465.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 466-67.
88. Ironically, the district court did not certify the request for back pay for the claims of pay
discrimination, concluding that individualized inquiries would be necessary. Id. at 468.
89. Beck v. Boeing Co., 60 F. App'x 38, at 39-40 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished).
90. Barefield v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., No. C-86-2427-TEH, 1988 WL 188433, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 6, 1988) (citing Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied,
785 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1986) (applied in asbestos case)). Note, however, that in Smith v. Texaco, the
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considered incidental when treated as an outgrowth of defendant's systemic
misconduct:
[T]he addition of a class-wide claim for punitive damages, to claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief, and lost pay, does not render the monetary
aspect of the case predominant. Rather, such relief may be treated as
ancillary to the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief which remain at
the heart of this action. 9'
However, while punitive damages may lend themselves to class
certification, plaintiffs should not be limited to such damages in order to get
a class certified.
Other plaintiffs have pursued compensatory damages but sought to
reduce their complexity to increase the likelihood of certification, despite
the fact that such an approach may yield lower damages for the class.
While some courts require substantial evidence to justify the award of
compensatory damages,9 2 others may grant such damages for "garden
variety" emotional harm and distress claims, without requiring medical or
other expert testimony. 93 However, such "garden variety" compensatory
claims will likely yield lesser, if not nominal, damages for class members. 94
In an effort to assuage the court of manageability concerns, plaintiffs

Fifth Circuit suggested that in Title VII cases, in accordance with Allison and Jenkins, punitive damages,
like compensatory damages, rely on individual inquiries when considering predominance. Despite the
fact that the Smith v. Texaco opinion was withdrawn and the case dismissed, the Fifth Circuit may retain
this view. Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 263 F.3d 394, 408-13, n.23 (5th Cir. 2001), withdrawn, 281 F.3d 477
(5th Cir. 2002). Interestingly, the court in Allison even conceded that class-wide awards of punitive
damages may be appropriate under some circumstances. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d
402, 417 (5th Cir. 1998).
91. Barefield, 1988 WL 188433, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1988) (citing Fontana v. Elrod, 826 F.2d
729, 730 (7th Cir. 1987) (certifying a (b)(2) class seeking punitive damages)); Stolz v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters Local 971, 620 F. Supp. 396, 406-07 (D. Nev. 1985) (certifying a (b)(2) class seeking
punitive damages); Edmondson v. Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375, 383 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (certifying a (b)(2) class
seeking compensatory and punitive damages); accord Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No C-94-4335 SI,
1996 WL 421436 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1996). Some courts have also awarded punitive damages on a
class-wide basis in cases outside of the employment and civil rights contexts. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate
of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786 (9th Cir. 1996) (human rights violations); In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d
790 (9th Cir. 2000) (environmental claims), reh"g granted, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001); Day v. NLO,
851 F. Supp. 869, 884-85, 887 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (permitting plaintiff class to seek punitive damages for
injuries allegedly resulting from radiation exposure).
92. See, e.g., Allison, 151 F.3d at 417; Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 938-40
(5th Cir. 1996) (citing cases); Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1250-56 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing
cases).
93. For example, in Burrell v. Crown Central Petroleum, plaintiffs who chose not to put forth
medical or psychiatric evidence to prove emotional harm and distress damages were excused from
having to produce such information in discovery. See Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, 177 F.R.D.
376 (E.D. Tex. 1997). The court concluded that where the "crux of the case is the work-related income
loss resulting from discrimination[,]" then "[miental anguish is incident[al] to the work-related
economic damages like lost wages." Id. at 380.
94. See, e.g., Burrell, 177 F.R.D. at 384.
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compromise the amount of damages to which they may be entitled. Again,
95
plaintiffs choose between full relief and class certification.
Whether plaintiffs forgo compensatory or punitive damages or both, or
limit their potential relief, defendants are protected by the uncertainty
created by the courts' narrow predomination test. Where plaintiffs are risk
averse, defendants found guilty of intentional discrimination are inoculated
from the risk of having to pay significant damages. Because plaintiffs
appropriately fear that they will not be able to get a (b)(2) case certified if
they seek monetary damages as well as injunctive relief, defendants enjoy a
windfall.
Moreover, the restrictive predomination interpretation not only gives
defendants a monetary boon, it also undermines deterrence objectives. If
compensatory and punitive damages are per se not "incidental," plaintiffs
are less likely to obtain certification when they seek the most significant
damage awards.96 Ironically, in the most egregious discrimination caseswhere systemic intentional misconduct results in extensive emotional harm
and warrants punitive damages-defendants enjoy the most protection from
class-wide exposure. Alternatively, where plaintiffs seek backpay-an
equitable remedy that merely makes the plaintiffs whole--defendants are
more likely to incur class-wide liability because such mandatory relief is
considered "incidental." Thus, defendants have a greater risk of a monetary
penalty when there is less money at stake. Deterrence objectives of Title
VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are not served where defendant's only
real exposure to class-wide relief involve those cases concerning the least
amount of money.
Finally, plaintiffs who sacrifice damages for the sake of (b)(2)
certification risk being attacked as inadequate class representatives. Where
a plaintiff fails to pursue all of the claims available to the class, such as
95. Such a quandary could be ameliorated in the Ninth Circuit, where the courts permit plaintiffs
or
to seek compensatory damages for emotional harm and distress without introducing economic loss
medical evidence. Instead, the plaintiffs own testimony and inferences from the circumstances may
form the basis for proof of an individual's emotional harm and distress. See Phiffer v. Proud Parrot
Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Hale, 940 F.2d 1192, 1193 (9th Cir.
1991); Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 513 (9th Cir. 2000).
Class members who suffer in similar ways could reasonably be rewarded similar compensatory
damages. For example, in a multi-party case, Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1011 (9th Cir. 1999),
each plaintiff received an identical award of $75,000 where "the jury likely concluded that the emotional
harm to each plaintiff was roughly equal given the similar treatment each plaintiff suffered at the hands
of the defendants." A similar approach could be taken for class members.
96. To the extent that class members have incurred different amounts of compensatory and
punitive damages because of their individual circumstances, it follows that certification of a mandatory
class action might be less desirable-especially in cases involving extensive monetary damagesbecause of a break down in class cohesion. Those class members who have a greater financial stake in
the litigation would seek to have their due process rights protected through notice and the right to optout, features required under (b)(3). However, these protections and others could be provided in a (b)(2)
class, subject to the court's discretion.
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compensatory and punitive damages claims, absent class members may be
precluded from later raising such claims individually because of res
judicata.9 7 For example, in Zachery v. Texaco Exploration andProduction,
Inc.,98 the named plaintiffs decided to drop their claims for compensatory
and punitive damages to maximize the chance of getting their Title VII case
for class-wide disparate treatment certified under Rule 23(b)(2). The court
denied certification because it was "greatly concern[ed]" that the named
plaintiffs' unilateral decision to drop the damages claims would preclude
class members in the future from being able to seek the monetary damages
to which they were entitled.99
Moreover, because the law is not yet settled on the question of whether
a class member is entitled to opt out from a (b)(2) class seeking monetary
damages, the court in Zachery was hesitant to permit plaintiffs to "gamble
away . . . class members' potential rights to compensatory" and punitive
damages.0 ' Given that the named plaintiffs chose not to pursue the
monetary damages that some class members wanted and might not have had
the opportunity to seek individually, the court concluded that the named
plaintiffs were inadequate representatives due to a conflict of interest.1"'
Plaintiffs and their attorneys should not be forced into the dilemma of
having to forgo monetary damages to obtain class certification. Due
process requires that in order for an absent class member to be bound by a
class judgment, his interests must have been adequately represented in the
class proceedings. Plaintiffs who seek to curtail intentional employment
discrimination on a large scale, however, are being forced to choose
between pursuing all available claims or being deemed inadequate because
they decided to forgo certain claims or relief to improve their chance of
class certification. Equating adequacy with strategy, however, may lead to
97. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984) (holding that a
class action decision generally binds the parties in subsequent decisions).
98.

185 F.R.D. 230, 242-44 (W.D. Tex. 1999).

99. Id. at 243 ("It is a very real possibility, if not a probability, that another court of competent
jurisdiction could determine that the proposed class members would be barred from bringing individual

actions for damages arising from intentional acts of discrimination if the class obtained a finding of
intentional discrimination in this Court.").
100.

Id. at 244 (discussing Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 118-21 (1994) (per curiam)

(6-3 decision)).
101.

Id. at 244, 245; see Bartlett II, supra note 19, at 2165 (discussing the competing goals of

23(b)(2) class certification and 23(b)(3) class certification in terms of the interests of the parties); Piar,
supra note 64, at 323-24 (discussing same); but see Farmers Group, Inc. v. Geter, Nos. 09-03-404 CV,
09-03-396 CV, 2004 WL 2365394, at *6 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, Oct. 21, 2004) (not finding possible

conflict of interest as grounds for inadequacy). See also Miller v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 202
F.R.D. 195, 203 (D. Md. 2001) (court denied plaintiffs motion for leave to amend class complaint to
drop claims for compensatory and punitive damages, concluding that the motion "raises serious
questions regarding the ability of the named plaintiffs to represent the putative class adequately");
Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 721 (11 th Cir. 2004) (named plaintiffs' willingness to forego
damages to achieve class certification called into question their adequacy to represent the class).
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untoward results. Certainly, in any class action there are bound to be
differences among the named plaintiffs and the other class members about
various strategic decisions, including what claims to bring and relief to
seek. The court must protect the interests of the class as a whole; if there is
a minority of class members who diverge from the whole, the court may
For example, such
take measures to protect its separate interests.
differences might be better resolved by certifying subclasses or specific
issues under Rule 23(c)(4), rather than denying certification altogether.
In sum, Allison's restrictive predomination interpretation threatens to
decrease the amount of monetary damages to which victims of employment
discrimination are entitled. In an effort to save the class action mechanism,
which is critical to civil rights enforcement, plaintiffs are compelled to
make a Hobson's choice. Plaintiffs are forced to choose between
certification and full relief. On the one hand, plaintiffs must forgo certain
relief (primarily compensatory and punitive damages) to improve their
chances of certification. On the other hand, plaintiffs must seek complete
relief so as not to be deemed inadequate or to preclude class members from
certain remedies based on res judicata." 2
C. Plaintiffs Will Have to Meet the More Rigorous and Costly
CertificationStandards of Rule 23(b)(3)
Since the Fifth Circuit and other courts increasingly have been denying
victims of employment discrimination (b)(2) certification where they seek
compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief, plaintiffs
have been compelled to seek (b)(3) certification, which imposes a more
formidable standard that has not historically been used in Title VII cases.
This movement has subjected plaintiffs to greater costs and burdens.
First, the cost of pursuing a (b)(3) class is greater than a (b)(2) class,
which may chill Title VII enforcement for some plaintiffs and their counsel.
Pursuit of a (b)(3) case may cost more than a (b)(2) one because the named
plaintiffs are required to send personal notice to each individual class
member who can be identified through reasonable effort, pursuant to Rule
23(c)(2)(B). Because class counsel must attempt to identify, locate and
contact every potential class member, notice can be prohibitively expensive,
which in turn may discourage class counsel from bringing meritorious civil
rights cases. Appropriate notice may be ordered at the discretion of the
court for a (b)(2) class, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2)(A) and Rule 23(d), and
may take many forms, including much less expensive methodologies such
1°3 However, notice under
as publication notice or postings on websites.
102. See Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 202 F.R.D. at 203 (describing "Hobson's Choice").
103. The Advisory Committee Note to the 2003 Amendments explains that the court's "authority to
direct notice to class members in a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class action should be exercised with care." The
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(b)(3)-a cost plaintiffs usually bearo4 -- must be the "best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort."' 5 For example,
notice to the class can easily cost hundreds of thousands of dollars,
depending on the size and nature of the case. 1 6 Thus, the cost of (b)(3)
notice may chill plaintiffs from bringing class-wide civil rights cases,
resulting in the under-enforcement of Title VII.
Second, the provision of opt-out rights under provision (b)(3) may
undermine the plaintiffs' ability to settle. If a significant number of class
members opt out, thereby denying the defendant the "peace" he bought, a
settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate to the class may be jeopardized.
Third, those plaintiffs who are able and willing to bear the higher cost
of notice and the risk that opt-outs may undermine a potential settlement,
also face a more difficult certification standard under Rule 23(b)(3) in
certain circuits. Because Rule 23(b)(3) is designed to provide aggregate
litigation where there is the least amount of cohesiveness among class
members, it requires that: (1) common questions predominate over
individual ones; and (2) the class action is superior to other mechanisms.107
Although the question of whether a pattern or practice of discrimination
exists often suffices as a common question under Rule 23(a)(2), individual
determinations of compensatory and punitive damages often dwarf this
common question under Rule 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs' ability to overcome the
(b)(3) hurdle often depends on the extent to which courts believe that
compensatory and punitive damages must be determined on an
individualized basis and through labor-intensive hearings.0 8 Those courts
which conclude that individualized hearings on damages are necessary will
Advisory Committee cautions the court to consider the costs of notice and encourages informal and
inexpensive means when possible:
The court may decide not to direct notice after balancing the risk that notice costs may deter
the pursuit of class relief against the benefits of notice. . . . When the court does direct
certification notice in a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class action, the discretion and flexibility established
by subdivision (c)(2)(A) extend to the method of giving notice. . . . Informal methods may
prove effective. A simple posting in a place visited by many class members, directing
attention to a source of more detailed information, may suffice. The court should consider the
costs of notice in relation to the probable reach of inexpensive methods.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 2003 amendments subdiv. (c), para. (2).
104. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 32.42 (2004); see also Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
106. See, e.g., Aheam v. Fibreboard Co., 162 F.R.D. 505, 528 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (cost of notice to
absent class members was approximately $22 million).
107. See Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the New Millennium and the
Blurring of CategoricalImperatives, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 215, 215 (because Rule 23(b)(2)
classes "do not need to meet the more stringent 23(b)(3) requirements of predominance and superiority,
certification under the mandatory classes is viewed as easier, and more desirable").
108. Courts are also impacted by whether they believe individual class members must still prove
liability after a class-wide liability determination.
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likely also conclude that a class action is not superior to other mechanisms
because of manageability problems.'09
The courts may be developing another schism over their willingness to
certify cases under (b)(3) where plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive
damages as well as injunctive relief for Title VII violations. For example,
the Fifth Circuit and Eleventh Circuits-which are apt to conclude that
damages must be determined on an individualized basis-are also more
likely to deny (b)(3) certification on the grounds that individualized
The Third and Seventh
inquiries predominate over common ones.'
Circuits, however, have demonstrated a greater willingness to certify (b)(3)
classes under similar circumstances.'' For example, in Chiang v. Veneman,
plaintiffs challenged the United States Department of Agriculture for
lending discrimination, in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
The Third Circuit held that (b)(3)'s predominance and superiority
requirements were met despite the fact that plaintiffs sought approximately
2.8 billion dollars in damages, which plaintiffs conceded involved
individualized proof."2 In Lemon v. International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 139, the Seventh Circuit vacated a district court's class
certification order under (b)(2), concluding that individualized inquiries
were necessary to determine compensatory and punitive damages in this
Title VII case. The Seventh Circuit, however, then directed the district
court to consider various alternative class certification options under (b)(3).
Thus, plaintiffs are again being subjected to different standards of justice,
depending upon the circuit in which their case is brought.
The additional challenges of (b)(3) certification in certain circuits
threaten to discourage plaintiffs from pursuing meritorious civil rights
cases, resulting in the under-enforcement of Title VII. Under the restrictive
predomination test, some plaintiffs will be prohibited from bringing a case
under either (b)(2) or (b)(3). For those class members who can not bring
their cases individually, they will be precluded from vindicating their
statutory rights at all. Thus, the ad hoc predomination test is necessary to
preserve the Title VII enforcement scheme.

109.

Moreover, courts may be concerned that bifurcation violates the Seventh Amendment's Re-

examination Clause, now that both stages of Title VII cases are tried to a jury. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo

Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422-25 (5th Cir. 1998). The Reexamination Clause states that "no fact
tried by jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co.,
283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931) (regarding same).
110.
2004).

See, e.g., Allison, 151 F.3d 402; Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 721-23 (1lth Cir.

111. See, e.g., Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577, 581-82 (7th
Cir. 2000); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 273 (3d Cir. 2004).

112.

Chiang, 385 F.3d at 273.
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IV.
THE ROBINSON AD HOC BALANCING TEST IS A SUPERIOR PREDOMINATION
TEST FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII
The Second Circuit's ad hoc balancing approach enforces Title VII and
its underlying purposes better than the Allison restrictive predomination
approach.
First, the Robinson approach more aptly recognizes the
underlying rationale of the (b)(2) class and its basis in class cohesiveness.
As a number of scholars have noted, the presence of monetary damageseven nonincidental ones-does not necessarily trample the cohesiveness of
a class bound by a common injury where injunctive or declaratory relief is
appropriate to the class as a whole." 3 Recognizing both the words and
spirit of Title VII, the Robinson ad hoc balancing test properly compares the
value of the monetary damages to the injunctive and declaratory relief
sought. Utilizing an overly-narrow definition of incidental, the Allison test
improperly gives inordinate weight to the individualized nature of monetary
damages and insufficient weight to the value of class-wide injunctive and
declaratory relief.
The Robinson ad hoc approach sufficiently addresses potential due
process concerns by promoting the use of traditional safeguards such as
bifurcation of class-wide liability and individual damages determinations,'14
importation of notice and the right to opt out of mandatory classes, and the
use of significant judicial discretion and oversight." 5 Moreover, use of
Rule 23(c)(4) to permit certification solely of class-wide liability issues
under (b)(2) properly recognizes a district court's power to certify certain
issues as a tool for managing complex litigation, rather than as an end run
around Rule 23.116

113. See Hart, supra note 41, at 827 ("The fact that individual members may also have individual
damage claims against the employer does not necessarily diminish the significance of the shared burden.
Nor does the existence of individual damages claims create intragroup conflict..."); W. Lyle Stamps,
Getting Title VII Back on Track: Leaving Allison Behindfor the Robinson Line, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 411,

432-33, 447-48 (2003) (calling the Allison approach overly inclusive because neither the text nor plain
meaning of aavisory committee note requires that monetary damages be secondary, insignificant or
dependent upon injunctive or declaratory relief to be appropriate under (b)(2)).
114. Various courts have promoted the use of bifurcation and hybrid claims to preserve class
certification where plaintiffs seek monetary damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief under
Title VII, as discussed supra in Part II.E. Various scholars have promoted the same. See, e.g., Robert
M. Brava-Partian, Due Process, Rule 23 and Hybrid Classes: A PracticalSolution, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
1359, 1363-78 (2002); Meghan E. Changelo, Reconciling Class Action Certification with the Civil
Rights Act of1991, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 133, 152-62 (2003).
115.

See Hart, supra note 41, at 814; Stamps, supra note 113, at 434.
116. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 167-69 (2d Cir. 2001); Allison,
151 F.3d at 421-22 (accusing plaintiffs of attempting to "manufacture predominance through the nimble

use of subdivision (c)(4)" through severance of individual specific issues). See also, Piar, supra note 64,
at 324-35 (describing attempt to reconcile the Civil Rights Act of 1991 remedies with Rule 23(b)(2) as
distorting both).
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The Robinson ad hoc approach protects victims of employment
discrimination by preserving one of the most powerful enforcement
mechanisms available-the class action device. Damage limits of up to
$300,000 under Title VII have led some to believe that employment
discrimination cases are no longer negative value suits-not worth the cost
of litigation." 7 Empirical research indicates, however, that the availability
of attorneys' fees, monetary damages, and litigation on an individual basis
does not overcome the negative value suit dilemma faced by those denied
class certification."'
Furthermore, without strength in numbers in
employment
discrimination
actions,
individual
employees
are
understandably deterred from bringing suit by fear of retaliation and
personal exposure." 9 Even if plaintiffs may have a greater incentive to
pursue their individual claims because of Title VII's $300,000 damage cap,
plaintiffs are not able to spread the costs of litigation as class members
would be able to in the class action context. 2 ° Thus, the class action device
permits employees to challenge widespread discriminatory practices that
would otherwise go unaddressed. Moreover, the increase in individual suits
that may follow from fewer class certifications would create further backlog
in the courts, undermining judicial economy and efficiency.''
The Robinson ad hoc approach has been criticized because certification
has the potential to pressure innocent defendants overwhelmed by the
confluence of bad publicity, exorbitant litigation costs, and tremendous risk
into unfavorable settlements.'22 While class certification often changes the
bargaining power of the parties to the detriment of defendants, there is no
reason to believe that defendants, who often control the evidence, would not
be able to defeat truly meritless claims through the use of dispositive
motions.
Although the Robinson scheme "sacrifices simplicity for flexibility,"' 23
such flexibility is crucial to the enforcement of Title VII. The Robinson ad
hoc approach affords proper deference to the trial court in its certification

117.

Piar, supra, note 64, at 314, 331.

118. See Stamps, supra note 113, at 444-47 (concluding that Allison approach would "effectively
eviscerate Title VII enforcement" and that "many individual plaintiffs may be effectively barred from

bringing their claims due to the small recoveries available compared to litigation expenses").
119. Idat 446.
120.

Bartlett III, supra note 19, at 2183.

121.

See Stamps, supra note 113, at 447.
122. Piar, supra note 64, at 343-45; Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the DemocraticDifficulty:
Rethinking the Intersection of PrivateLitigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 71, 77 (2003)

(characterizing private class action attorneys as "bounty hunters"); George Priest, The Economics of
Class Actions, 9 KAN. J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 481, 482 (2000); Nagareda, supra note 23, at 163; Charles
Silver, "'We'reScared to Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1357
(2003).
123.

See Hart, supra note 41, at 829; see also Changelo,supra note 104, at 151.
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determination. It is well established that courts enjoy broad discretion in
this determination, given the highly factual nature of this inquiry.24
The Robinson scheme has been criticized for not sufficiently taking
into account potential efficiency and manageability concerns that could
arise from certification of compensatory and punitive damages in a (b)(3)
125
class following certification of class-wide liability in a (b)(2) class.
Robinson arguably fails to provide, even with the protection of notice and
opt-out rights, how the determination of class-wide damages for numerous
individuals would efficiently take place in the context of a (b)(3) class that
was bifurcated from a (b)(2) class determining a pattern or practice of
discrimination. 126 As a solution, Meghan Changelo wisely proposes that the
courts adopt the Ninth Circuit's approach in Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance
Co.,127 which permits individuals to litigate their damages in individual
trials at the remedial stage, rather than on a class-wide basis.12 Many
courts disallow this approach on the grounds that damages claims should
have been asserted in the context of the (b)(2) liability class and are
therefore waived. 129 Courts could permit such bifurcation by giving res
judicata effect to a (b)(2) class-wide liability finding and allowing class
members to bring damages claims in individual subsequent actions. 3 ' This
solution would be palatable, however, only if courts permitted plaintiffs to
seek injunctive and declaratory relief on a class-wide basis, without being
deemed inadequate for failure to seek monetary damages.
Overall, the Second Circuit's ad hoc approach is superior to the Fifth
Circuit's bright-line one because the former ensures that plaintiffs can
effectively vindicate their Title VII statutory rights, courts can exercise their
proper discretion under Rule 23, and Congress's will, as articulated in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, is respected.

124.

See Stamps, supra note 113, at 436; 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., supra note 19,

23.80[l]

(3d ed. 2005); 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.14, at 97
(4th ed. 2002).

125.
complex
126.
127.

Changelo, supra note 104, at 159-60 ("[T]he test provided by the Robinson court is overly
and therefore unlikely to be efficiently or consistently applied by lower courts.").
Idat 159.
Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed as

improvidently granted,511 U.S. 117 (1994).

128.
129.

Id. at 392 (9th Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., Zachery v. Texaco Exploration and Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex.

1999).

130.

Changelo, supra note 104, at 159-61.
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V.
THE IMPACT OF RECENT LEGISLATION ON PREVENTING POTENTIAL
JUDICIAL ABUSE OF CLASS CERTIFICATION

To the extent that the most recent amendments to Rule 23 and the
recently enacted Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 curtail potential judicial
abuse of discretion, district courts will not be able to abuse their power
easily under the Robinson ad hoc certification scheme. Such safeguards,
designed to reign in judicial and attorney misconduct, should temper any
great concern that the Second Circuit's ad hoc balancing test will go
unchecked.
A.

Amended Rule 23

Amended Rule 23, which went into effect on December 1, 2003,
contains multiple safeguards to ensure that class members' rights are
protected. Moreover, the amendments often confirm or add to the court's
discretion-demonstrating a certain degree of confidence in the judicial
system's ability to responsibly make class certification decisions. For
example, the court is no longer required to make certification decisions "as
soon as practicable," but instead "at an early practicable time.' 131 While
this change may seem minor, it stems from the important recognition that
courts often need sufficient time to permit class discovery and to entertain
dispositive motions before deciding certification. 132 The amended rule
encourages district courts to make prompt and well-informed decisions.
Additional time for the class certification decision would give courts the
opportunity to weigh all the factors necessary in an "ad hoc" certification
approach.
For the first time, the Rule explicitly states that a district court "may
direct appropriate notice to the class" for mandatory class actions.' 33 While
Rule 23(c)(2)(A) merely codifies existing practice, the amendment makes
clear that courts have the power, when certifying a (b)(2) class, to require
notice when appropriate.' 34 A court no longer need solely rely on its
discretionary power under Rule 23(d) to provide notice for (b)(2) classes to
address due process concerns. The amended Rule also indicates that the
courts can be entrusted with more discretion and flexibility when handling
class actions and protecting class members' due process rights.
The amendments to Rule 23 force the district court to define the class it
is certifying and to more rigorously prove that the certification criteria are
met. Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires the court to "define the class and the class
131.
132.
133.
134.

FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.

R. Civ.
R. Civ.
R. Civ.
R. Civ.

P. 23(c)(1)(A).
P. 23 advisory committee's note.
P. 23(c)(2)(A).
P. 23 advisory committee's note.

432

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

Vol. 26:2

claims, issues or defenses," in its order. 135 Rule 23(c)(1)(C) no longer
allows the court to conditionally certify a class. While the court may alter
or amend its certification order prior to final judgment, the court may no
longer evade the certification criteria by conditioning certification upon
circumstances that may never occur. The eradication of conditional
certification should assuage concerns of certification as a form of legalized
blackmail.'36 The fact that courts must now more rigorously prove that the
certification criteria are met ensures that courts applying the Robinson ad
hoc approach will have to carefully consider and justify their decisions.
This safeguard reduces the concern that courts applying the ad hoc
approach will improperly certify class actions.
Amendments to the Rule also provide additional protection for classes
certified under provision 23(b)(3). For example, Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires
that (b)(3) notice "concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood
language" certain information, including the right of exclusion and the
binding effect of class judgments. Additionally, Rule 23(e)(3) permits
courts to provide (b)(3) class members with a second chance to opt out
under certain settlements.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the new provisions (g) and (h)
protect the most fundamental due process concern of class certificationadequacy of representation-by imposing more rigorous standards for
selection of class counsel. Rule 23(g) requires that class counsel "fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class." While Rule 23(g) expands
upon Rule 23(a)'s adequacy requirement and codifies established practice
articulated in case law, the new provision also requires the court to follow a
formal appointment procedure and to consider certain enumerated factors.13 7
Rule 23(h) further monitors the selection of class counsel through its
enhanced examination of attorneys' fees. Thus, through the most recent
additions to Rule 23, adequacy of representation-the linchpin to class
litigation-is further protected.
The amendments to Rule 23 reign in the possibility for the class action
device to be misused. While many of the provisions simply codify existing
practice, the amendments clarify the proper boundaries for class

135. See also FED. R. Civ. P.23(c)(3).
136. See L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Torts
Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 222-25 (2004) (discussing the inequitable

bargaining advantage plaintiffs certified as a class have over defendants and noting that "[a]lthough the
danger of blackmail exists with respect to class certification, the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 lessen
this danger").

137. Rule 23(g) requires that courts consider: (1)"the work counsel has done in identifying or
investigating potential claims in the action"; (2) "counsel's experience in handling class actions, other
complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in the action"; (3) "counsel's knowledge of the
applicable law"; and (4) "the resources counsel will commit to representing the class." FED. R. Civ. P.

23(g).
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certification and management. These protections ensure that a court's use
of the ad hoc approach will be properly checked. While the amendments
serve to reinforce the court's boundaries, many of them expand and bolster
the court's discretion in the class certification process. This is not
surprising given the long held deference courts have enjoyed when making
class certification determinations.
B.

The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, perhaps the most sweeping
legislation impacting how class actions will be litigated, was enacted on
February 18, 2005.138 The Act, purportedly designed to curtail "abuses of
the class action device" that have transpired over the last decade,139 should
help to curb potential state judicial abuse of discretion in certification
decisions. Perhaps the most significant and controversial component of the
Act is its liberalization of the jurisdictional requirements for class actions
brought in federal courts on the grounds of diversity. The Act permits
certain class actions with national implications to be heard more easily in
federal court by requiring only minimal diversity among the parties for
original jurisdiction to exist and by creating a more lenient device for
removal of class actions from state to federal court. 4 ° The impetus behind
this provision is a perception that state courts are less likely than federal
courts to conduct a rigorous analysis when determining the propriety of
class certification. 4 ' Thus, by making it easier for such cases to be heard in
federal court, where certification issues might presumably by more
rigorously analyzed, the number of certifications improvidently granted
should diminish.
Assuming that this liberalization of the jurisdictional standards results
in fewer improper class certifications of civil rights cases-and not just
fewer civil rights class actions' 42-the Act should curtail some mischief by
those state courts who would abuse their discretion. By shifting some class
cases from state to federal court, the Act would seem to suggest that
Congress has some measure of confidence that the federal courts will
exercise their discretion responsibly. The Act-while not a ringing
endorsement of class actions-seems at least a vote of confidence in the
138.
139.

Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
S. 5, 109th Cong. §2 (2005).

140.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2005).

141.

See, e.g., S.R. REP. No. 109-14, at 14 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 314-15

(commenting that state courts are more lax in certification and noting high caseloads and a lack of
judicial resources in state courts).
142. This, of course, is a real concern given the overwhelming docket under which the federal
courts labor today and the propensity for some federal courts to be hostile to such claims. See Hart,
supra note 41, at 835-46 (ascribing fewer employment discrimination class actions to the perception that
such cases are unfair, unnecessary and unmeritorious).
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federal judiciary's overall ability to fairly assess the propriety of class
certification. And where the federal courts have been less diligent, such as
in the settlement of consumer class actions, the Act has developed
considerable new safeguards. 143 Thus, to the extent that the Act has
facilitated a shift of class actions from state to federal court, the Act
demonstrates Congress's confidence in the federal judiciary's discretion.
VI.
CONCLUSION

One of the most important tools for effective civil rights enforcement is
in jeopardy. Should the majority's rigid interpretation of the predomination
requirement prevail, employees fighting systemic intentional discrimination
will be denied one of their most powerful weapons in their arsenal for
justice-the class action.
Specifically, the restrictive interpretation threatens to undermine civil
rights enforcement by diminishing the number of class actions, depriving
employees of full relief, and imposing greater costs and burdens on those
employment discrimination class actions that do survive. Deterrence and
fairness will be undermined. The ad hoc approach, on the other hand,
respects the courts' discretion and properly reconciles the goals of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and Rule 23. The ad hoc approach's flexibility allows
plaintiffs to seek full relief, while enjoying due process protections
available through hybrid certification and discretionary notice and opt-out
rights. The recent amendments to Rule 23 and the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 only curb potential judicial abuse, and confirm the propriety of
allowing federal courts wide latitude in making class certification
determinations.
The class action is vital to curtailing employment
discrimination. Consequently, should the Supreme Court have occasion to
consider the propriety of the predomination test in the future, it should
embrace the ad hoc balancing test adopted by the minority of circuits to
preserve this essential tool.

143.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1711-15 (2005).

